The  Long  Tail  and  Demand  Creation  in the  Legal  Marketplace by Killian, Kristen E.
Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 11
Number 1 Winter 2015 Article 7
Winter 2015
The Long Tail and Demand Creation in the Legal
Marketplace
Kristen E. Killian
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kristen E. Killian, The Long Tail and Demand Creation in the Legal Marketplace, 11 Hastings Bus. L.J. 157 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol11/iss1/7




Law firms have begun unbundling their work within their firms.1
Nonlawyers now do many tasks typically done by lawyers in a
bundled services regime. Just one example is the time-intensive due
diligence for mergers and acquisitions) As unbundling proceeds, the
door has been opened for new legal technology companies driving a
business model in which no one, not even a lawyer, assists the
consumer with basic legal tasks such as creating and completing form
legal documents. In short, software replaces certain transactional
work done by lawyers and nonlawyers alike.
Transactional legal work, as the term will be used in this note,
describes both transactional legal services and products.
"Transactional legal services" encompasses legal work for a client's
unique circumstances that require the handcrafting of a solution for a
particular legal issue by a lawyer-the "bespoke" legal services
Richard Susskind describes in Tomorrow's Lawyers.3 In addition,
transactional legal services includes some less unique, more
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The author
thanks Professor Abraham J. B. Cable and David W. Johnson for their support, guidance, and
editorial assistance. The author of this publication was a Summer Associate at Cooley LLP in
2014. The author did not receive any funding for her research on this publication from Cooley
LLP.
1. Milton Regan, Jr. & Palmer Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The
Disagyegation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2148 (2010).
2. Id. See, e.-., AI&A Due Diligence, PANGEA3, http://www.pangea3.com/solutions/
corporate/due-diligence.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (Pangea3 is a legal process outsourcing
firm servicing international corporations and law firms).
3. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE
23-24 (2013).
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standardized legal work, such as drafting venture capital financing
agreements on standard form documents.4  These kinds of
transactional legal work still require lawyer involvement and thus
cannot be fully automated (at this time).
In contract, "transactional legal products" are truly replicable
legal documents, some of which are already available to consumers
who complete them without individually consulting a lawyer.5 That is,
generally speaking, a lawyer is not needed to effect the document's
creation and completion.6 Such legal documents are widely available
through platforms like LegalZoom.i So, for purposes of this note, we
will assume that once a lawyer is removed from the document
creation, the legal work is a legal product, and is no longer amenable
to being categorized as a legal service.8  Susskind dubs this
"commoditized legal work." 9
We can envision all transactional legal work along a continuum
of deliverable replicability. The least-replicable work, the bespoke
legal services, on one end; the most-replicable legal work,
commoditized legal products, on the other. While the result, whether
achieved via legal services or legal products, the resul may be
identical -for example, a final written and executed contract -but the
quality, efficiency, time required, cost, and thus the accessibility to the
layperson of that final contract-differ greatly between these two
modalities of legal work. With these two characterizations of legal
work, I seek to isolate and capture the needs of very different
4. SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 26. See, e.-., Model Legal Documents, NAT'L VENTURE
CAPITAL ASS'N, http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option-comcontent&view-article&id-108&It
emid-136 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
5. See, e.g., LEGALZOoM, http://www.legalzoom.com/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
6. However, LegalZoom offers access to LegalZoom's "plan" attorneys for a flat, monthly
fee to assist clients in completing these forms. See LegalZoom Business: Business Legal Plan
Page, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/business (last
visited Jan. 19, 2014).
7. LEGALZOOM, supra note 5.
8. While beyond the scope of this note, differentiating on a legal product versus legal
service continuum is an effort to acknowledge the violation of unauthorized practice of law
statutes if these new companies purported to deliver legal services. By denoting the legal
deliverables as legal products, this note attempts to acknowledge that this kind of legal work is
beyond the reach of typical unauthorized practice of law statutes. Again, further discussion of
current case law surrounding this issue would be needed to make any affirmative statement on
the unauthorized practice of law liability of these companies.
9. SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 25.
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consumers, even where the final deliverable is, or appears to be, the
same.
This note focuses on contract generation as an exemplar of
transactional legal work that could be either a legal service (requiring
a lawyer) or a legal product (automated online form).
Since the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession,
consumer behavior has shifted to embrace simplicity and value
economizing. 0 Companies delivering low-cost, or no-cost, simplified
legal products serve these new behavioral norms of post-recession
consumers. Since many consumers are unable to evaluate the
potential for increased quality of a contract drafted by a lawyer vis-A-
vis the do-it-yourself website (if there is any), and since they are
unable to afford a lawyer to draft or even review such a contract,
these value economizing legal consumers tend to either choose the
free, do-it-yourself contract or forego a formal contract altogether.1
While perhaps better than no written agreement at all, the do-it-
yourself choice puts consumers at risk from what may be a poorly
drafted contract. However, without a well-known and reliable
measure of quality for contracts, consumers readily embrace these
new companies' legal products to formalize (reduce to writing) their
previously informal (usually oral) agreements.
This note looks at those new legal technology companies that are
innovating transactional legal products, but not legal services. The
term Legal Tech Innovation Company ("LTIC") will be used here to
describe this category. The LTICs represent an innovative leap in
how companies that are not law firms provide legal products directly
to a consumer. Although these companies are not yet disrupting the
core of the legal marketplace, they are meaningfully lowering cost
and increasing efficiency through both simplification and speed. To
be sure, LTICs have the potential to disrupt legal services with
increased sophistication of software to produce certain legal work on
par with that of a lawyer's work while continuing to lower cost.>1
10. Paul Flatters & Michael Willmott, Understanding the Post-Recession Consumer, 87
HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 2009, at 108-09.
11. John T. Broderick & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself La rers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A21.
12. However, the closer the software approaches lawyer legal analysis and decision-making,
the more like the company will be liable for the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g.,
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Innovation creates demand when it shows consumers, sometimes
quite suddenly, something that they did not realize they were
missing." Two classic examples are Federal Express and the
smartphone. 14 By creating transactional legal products that are
inexpensive and provide meaningful value to consumers, LTICs are
creating demand where there once was none.
This note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the type of legal
consumers for whom LTICs are creating demand for their legal
products. Part II describes a few LTIC exemplars in greater detail.
Part III addresses policy considerations for the transactional legal
product and creation of demand. Part IV concludes with some
projections for our legal profession in this burgeoning environment of
legal technology innovation.
II. THE LONG TAIL
General consumer attitudes have changed as a response to the
2008 financial crisis. 5 As the neoclassical economist would claim, the
queen of the economy is the consumer.1 6 To capture the nascent, long
tail market of unsophisticated legal consumers, LTICs are creating
legal product offerings to align with these changes in consumer
attitudes. The heightened consumer value of economizing opens a
market for the LTIC offering a low-cost legal product as an
Disruptive Innovation, CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-
concepts/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2014). See also Tim Hwang, The Lairs of (Legal) Robotics:
Automatons, APIs, and the ABA 20-22 (Robot, Robot & Hwang LLP, Working Paper No. 1,
2013), available at http://www.robotandhwang.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The-Laws-of-
Legal-Robotics.pdf.
13. Thomas Overthun Interview, IDEO Associate Partner + Design Director,
DESIGNBLOOM (Feb. 28, 2014), http://ht.ly/ul8ro.
14. Dean Foust, Frederick W Smith: No Overnight Success, BLOOMBERG BUSJNESSWEEK
MAG., Sept. 19, 2004, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2004-09-19/frederick-w-
dot-smith-no-overnight-success. ("Merrill Lynch & Co. ('MER') execs even discovered
employees were using FedEx to deliver documents between floors of its Manhattan
headquarters building because it was faster and more reliable than the interoffice mail."). A
recent example of smartphone demand can be seen in the overwhelming sales numbers for the
recently released Apple iPhone 6 and 6 Plus. See Brian X. Chen & Mike Isaac, First- W4eekend
Sales of Apple " iPhone 6 lodels Top 10 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2010, at BI.
15. Flatters & Willmott, supra note 10.
16. Masanao Aoki & Hiroshi Yoshikawa, Demand Saturation-Creation and Economic
Growth, 48J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 127-54 (2002).
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alternative to often high-cost traditional legal services.17
A. LEGAL CLIENTS AS POST-RECESSION CONSUMERS
The financial crisis and subsequent recession exposed
"inefficiencies that have long plagued large firms."18 Faced with ever-
tightening budgets, sophisticated legal clients seek to reduce their
legal expenses by negotiating lower or blended contingency rates,
proactively controlling the services they purchase, bringing more
lawyers in-house to perform similar work, or foregoing some legal
services altogether. 9  Cost-cutting measures coupled with
technological developments in computing allow niche markets to
form and bear fruit-for example, online platforms for in-house legal
departments to track and manage the company's legal expenses.20
Research supports the conclusion that not just sophisticated legal
clients are seeking new ways to increase efficiency in their legal
services purchasing, but a much broader potential client base is
"foregoing the assistance of lawyers when confronted with a civil legal
issue and addressing their matters through self-representation,"
including through "alternatives... available over the internet."''
In 2009, the Harvard Business Review published an article by
two consumer trends experts, Paul Flatters and Michael Willmott.
They describe post-recession consumer trends based on two decades
of forecasting and analysis to advise global companies across sectors
on the recession's likely impacts on long-term consumer behavior.22
The authors argue that while recessions may differ in their causes,
depth, and duration, it is possible to anticipate consumer behavior by
17. Flatters & Willmott, supra note 10.
18. Car Sommer, How Entrepreneurship Is Reshaping the Legal Industrv, FORBES (July
24, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/carisommer/2013/07/24/how-entrepreneurship-
is-reshaping-the-legal-industry/.
19. ALTMAN WELL, CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER SURVEY: AN ALTMAN WELL FLASH SURVEY ii
(2013), available at http://www.altmanweil.com/dir-docs/resource/4dlf2'7b-5e52-46b3-8a70-637
2f360a85cdocument.pdf.
20. See, e.g., VIEWABILL, https://www.viewabill.com/pages/home (last visited Mar. 17,
2014); SIMPLELEGAL, http://www.simplelegal.com! (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
21. H. RITCHEY HOLLENBAUGH, AM. BAR ASS'N REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/deliverylegal
_services/Is resolution and report_108.authcheckdam.pdf.
22. Id.
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understanding three key themes: how previous downturns have
altered consumer psychology and activity; how this recession
compares with previous ones; and the journey that consumers have
taken to the present.
Through their analysis, Flatters and Willmott identified four key
trends in consumer behavior that accelerated after the recession: (1)
consumer demand for simplicity, (2) a call for ethical business
governance, (3) a desire to economize, and (4) a tendency to flit from
one offering to another (willingness to try new brands). 4
The change in consumer attitude identified in this current
business scholarship is apt in describing legal consumer behavior as
well. These new behavioral norms directly address some traditional
barriers that contribute to a consumer's decision to forgo legal
counsel: legal services as cost prohibitive; fear and anxiety over
information asymmetry when creating an attorney-client relationship
(the "lemons problem"); and consumer ignorance in knowing when,
optimally, a legal issue should be confronted.
First, post-recession consumers demand simplicity. ' For
transactional legal consumers, this desire translates into an affinity for
simplified choice making and an enthusiasm for less complicated,
more user-friendly technologies. 6 Because the law is a complex
industry with a historic information asymmetry between lawyer and
non-lawyer client, legal consumers are drawn to companies that
introduce simple, user-friendly technologies to facilitate the delivery
of transactional legal products. 7 Consumer appreciation for simplicity
in these products may also be due to a possible added benefit of
alleviating some of the consumer's anxiety that she or he will be taken
advantage of when obtaining transactional legal products for the first
time by making the process of legal document creation more
understandable to the lay legal consumer.
Second, post-recession consumers want corporate governance to




27. Sophisticated legal consumers are often lawyers themselves, as is the case with in-house
counsel at a corporation. Here, the focus is on nonlawyer, unsophisticated legal consumers.
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be ethical. 28 The 2008 financial crisis caused general consumers to be
increasingly suspicious of corporate misbehavior, particularly the
individuals and companies responsible for the mortgage crisis.29 With
respect to the legal profession, there was already a consumer culture
of lawyer mistrust. 30 The recession seemed to highlight the pain points
in the lawyer-client relationship, information asymmetry, and
inherent agency issues, arguably exacerbating the general consumers'
wariness of lawyers as being greedy, manipulative, and corrupt.31 A
historic lack of transparency seems to drive this lack of trust in
lawyers. 32 We might expect post-recession consumers to seek more
transparent legal knowledge, as in open-sourced legal products,33 that
have the potential to eliminate their concern with a lawyer's behavior
being ethical by removing the lawyer's blatant pecuniary interest
from the document's creation altogether.
Third, post-recession consumers want to economize.34 Since legal
services are often expensive and infrequently needed for most
consumers, post-recession legal consumers use existing, free (or low-
cost), and readily accessible legal resources online to accomplish the
legal task on a do-it-yourself basis, or "leverage" (read, not use) their
lawyers' time.35
The post-recession consumer's desire to economize coincides
with another related shift-decline in consumer respect for and
deference to authority, particularly government and business.36
Supporting this theory is the evidence that, as consumers become
ever-savvier information gatherers (enabled by the internet) and
28. Flatters & Willmott, supra note 10.
29. Id.
30. Marc Galanter, Faces of Mistrust. The Image of Lawrers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and
Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 809 (1997-1998); LEO J. SHAPIRO & AssoCs., SEC.
OF LITIG., AM. BAR ASS'N, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS CONSUMER RESEARCH
FINDINGS: PREPARED ON BEHALF OF SECTION OF LITIGATION 23 (2002), available at
http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate/publicperceptionsl.pdf.
31. SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., supra note 30, at 4; Larry Ribstein, The Death of Biz La , 2010
WIS. L. REV. 749, 753 (2010).
32. Ribstein, supra note 31, at 753.
33. The idea of open sourcing legal documents is discussed in detail in this note's Section
11.a. Open-Sourcing for Collaboration andNormalizedLegalKnoifledge, infra notes 70-75.
34. Flatters & Willmott, supra note 10.
35. Broderick & George, supra note 11.
36. Flatters & Willmott, supra note 10.
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decision-makers (improving reliability of that information), the
outdated, "traditional" sources of purchased information will fall
short of the consumers' expectations in the longer term.37 With their
increasing willingness to rely on user-generated and user-curated
information, post-recession consumers defer less to authority, which
may correlate to a softening in value of traditional legal advice by law
firms, with consumers opting for legal forums and
lawyer/legal/business blogs.38
Fourth, post-recession consumers are more willing than ever to
try new brands.39 A post-recession legal consumer's tendency to move
from one offering to another signals a consumer willingness to try-out
an LTIC's legal products that align with the new set of values
discussed above.40
These consumers, emboldened by user communities cataloguing
their experiences with increased transparency, have the potential to
create an emergent "wisdom of the crowd" so long as the group
maintains its diversity, independence, decentralization and, thus,
legitimacy. 41 Voices joined and knowledge shared, post-recession
consumers have been given increased leverage through their ability to
"vote with their feet 42 or more appropriately, "voting with their
clicks" -rewarding quality legal products and ultimately drawing
ever-more competent providers to the marketplace.
B. THE LONG TAIL
Where do post-recession consumers fit in today's legal
marketplace'? Bill Henderson's visualization and summary of today's
legal ecosystem is helpful in clarifying this reality, 43 (See Figure 1 in
37. Flatters & Willmott, supra note 10.
38. Id.; IPSOS MEDIACT, SOCIAL INFLUENCE: MARKETING'S NEW FRONTIER, CROWDTAP
SOCIAL INFLUENCE RESEARCH PAPER (2014), available at http://go.crowdtap.com/
socialinfluence.
39. Flatters & Willmott, supra note 10.
40. Id.
41. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS XIX (First Anchor Books 2005).
42. Vote ifith one's feet, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://idioms.thefreedictionary
.com/vote+with+feet (last visited Aug. 30, 2014).
43. Bill Henderson, A Counterpoint to "The most robust legal market that ever existed in




appendix). The y-axis of Henderson's chart follows the Heinz-
Laumann "Two-Hemisphere" theory that lawyers serve two principal
constituencies: individuals and organizations.44  The x-axis
incorporates Susskind's continuum of legal work, from bespoke to
standardized to systematized to productized to commoditized.
Occupying the left side of the graph, bespoke to standardized legal
services for both individuals and organizations is the artisan guild (all
sizes of law firms, public defenders and district attorneys).46
Transactional legal services fit within this left hand section of the
chart. In the middle lies standardized to productized legal work.47
Henderson collectively defines this section as multidisciplinary
teams.48 Multidisciplinary teams not only include traditional in-house
legal departments, but also new trends in legal businesses like legal
analytics, contract management vendors, non-pyramid structure law
firms, and online dispute resolution platforms.49 On the far right of
the chart is productized and commoditized legal work, which is
produced by the low cost providers. Henderson places e-discovery
vendors and legal publishers (what I will later refer to as automated
document assembly) like LegalZoom and Business Integrity's
ContractExpress in this section.50
The focus of this note, transactional legal products, falls into the
far right range of Henderson's chart occupied by the low-cost legal
publishers. Because the chart does not provide revenue estimates or
any other indicator of market potential, I will explore the market
potential for these low-cost providers.
In statistics, a power law is a relationship between two quantities,
where one quantity varies as a power of another and where the
frequency decreases faster than the size increases."' Power law has
this-country.html.







51. Powerla, PRINCETON, http://www.princeton.edu/-achaney/tmve/wikilOOk/docs/Power
_law.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2014)(an example of a power law function is Zipf's Law, where
frequency of an item or even is inversely proportional to its frequency rank). See Zipf's La,
WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ZipfsLaw.html (last updated Oct. 29,
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been used to describe many scientific and social phenomena. 5
Examples of power law distributions range from the frequency and
magnitude of earthquakes to the "80-20 rule" of wealth accumulation
(i.e., the Pareto Principle- eighty percent of wealth is controlled by
twenty percent of the population)5 3  Power law probability
distributions are inverted yield curves, in which the curve hugs the
vertical and horizontal axes. 4 The long tail is the narrowing portion
of this distribution curve away from the "head" or central part of the
distribution (See Figure 2)."
In 2004, Chris Anderson, former editor-in-chief of Wired
magazine, first published an article on the long tail in Wired, then
later refined the theory in his blog, The Long Tail, and in his book
published in 2006, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is
Selling Less for More.16 His theory of the long tail is that our culture
and economy are increasingly shifting away from a collective focus on
a relatively small number of blockbuster hits (i.e., seeking success in
mainstream products in mass markets) at the head of the demand
curve and moving toward selling a huge number of smaller hits (i.e.,
niches in the tail).5 Technologies can break down bottlenecks and
inefficiencies in traditional markets to make finding and buying niche
products easier and cheaper for consumers.5 8 He describes one
example of this theory's prediction to be that the aggregate demand
for products not available in traditional brick and mortar stores is
2014); Keith Hart, The Social leaning of the PowerLan. THE MEMORY BANK (Feb. 1, 2010,
5:39 PM), http://thememorybank.co.uk/ 2010/(P/01/the-social-meaning-of-the-power-law/.
52. Zipf's law explains the power law behind word usage frequency. Power]a if supra note
51; Zipf's La, supra note 51 (the frequency of any word is inversely proportional to its rank in
the frequency table).
53. Power lau, supra note 51; Hart, supra note 51. Pareto Distribution, WOLFRAM
MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ParetoDistribution.html (last modified Oct. 29,
2014) (the Pareto distribution is a power law probability distribution that is used to describe
social, scientific, geophysical, and other observable phenomenon).
54. See Figure 1; Hart, supra note 5 1.
55. See Figure 1. Long Tail, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/long-
tail.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
56. Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED (Oct. 2004); Paul L. Caron, The Long Tail of
Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L. J. 38, 38 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract- 944233.
57. Chris Anderson, About Chris Anderson, THE LONG TAIL: CHRIS ANDERSON'S BLOG,
http://www.longtail.com/thelong-tail/about.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014); Long Tail, supra
note 55.
58. Long Tail, supra note 55.
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potentially as big as the aggregate demand for those products that are
available. 9 The classic manifestation of this example is Amazon's
ability to access a massive inventory of books in comparison to the
brick and mortar bookstore that, however big, is still severely limited
by physical retail shelf space.60 Amazon's wild success in providing a
means to make purchasing an obscure, niche book easier and cheaper
helps prove the theory.
C. TuE LONG TAIL OF TRANSACTIONAL LEGAL WORK
In transactional legal work, new technologies break down the
bottleneck of individual lawyer-client representation because they
allow access to transactional legal products for any legal consumer.
This is important because many individuals and small businesses
cannot afford a lawyer's time. A cynic may claim this reality is due to
the fact that lawyers have a monopoly on providing legal services,
which creates suboptimal incentives when creating pricing
structures, 61 but it is important to remember that the price of hiring a
lawyer, in addition to the legal service and attorney work product,
must also include the costs of obtaining their legal degrees and bar
licenses, and maintaining legal practices. 6- These economics become a
factor in the LTIC niche: the hourly rate model makes hiring a lawyer
to provide transactional legal work cost prohibitive for most
individuals and small businesses. While the indigent criminal
defendant has the option to represent himself (pro se), the law's
59. Anderson, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. The motivations borne out of the billable hour business model incentivize inefficiencies
that are, in turn, borne by the end consumer of the legal services. There is a powerful monetary
incentive to spend as much time as the client will bear to complete any given task. It is "an
institutionalized disincentive to efficiency. It rewards lawyers who take longer to complete tasks
than their more organized colleagues, and it penalizes legal advisers who operate swiftly and
efficiently." SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 16. This is because the longer an attorney takes to
complete any given project, the more billable hours she can record to prove her productivity (to
make bonus and stay on track to partnership) and her partner in turn may prove her value to
the firm (by generating the most revenue possible). See also Steven Harper, The Tirannyv of the
Billable Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013, at A25.
62. E.g., the requirement to go to an ABA accredited law school and the costs of
malpractice exposure during practice.
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default is that counsel will be provided for him.63 However, in nearly
all legal transactions, there is no such right to counsel. Unless you can
afford a lawyer, the default is self-representation.
This economic reality within the transactional legal marketplace
generates an underserved (or unserved) market for transactional legal
products. This note will refer to this market as the "Long Tail" legal
market. This Long Tail legal market is accessible only after
technologies break down inefficiencies in the traditional transactional
legal market model to make finding and buying niche products easier
and cheaper for legal consumers.64 In their existing business models,
law firms have little incentive to offer products in the Long Tail; their
consumer base is in the head-where one finds high-stakes, complex
transactions that allow for larger profits.
The solo practitioner is the closest model for a lawyer's practice
that begins to correlate with the services needed to serve the Long
Tail. The problem with an army of solo practitioners serving the Long
Tail is it lacks the economy of scale. The economy of scale is essential
to successful execution of Anderson's tenets of the Long Tail: (1)
make everything available to the consumer; (2) cut the price in half,
then lower it; and (3) help the consumer find it.65
In the Long Tail, transactional legal products are commoditized
and therefore highly replicable. Ease of replicability lowers cost. Thus
the Long Tail neatly meshes with the burgeoning values of the post-
recession consumer, especially the desire to economize.
The LTICs profiled below couple the practical realities of shared
legal knowledge with existing advancements in technology to create
businesses that scale legal work for the Long Tail. LTICs offer legal
products into these niche markets by eliminating historic barriers to
entry for obtaining legal work by reducing cost, reducing fear and
63. It is well established through the Constitution and case law that criminal defendants
have the right to be represented by counsel, regardless of their ability to afford counsel. U.S.
Const. amend. VI (right to counsel in federal cases). See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (applying right to counsel in state prosecutions for felony offenses); Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
64. Anderson, supra note 56.
65. Anderson, supra note 57.
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anxiety, and providing more information and transparency for
consumers who were previously "in the dark. ,
66
III. STANDARDIZATION TO COMMODITIZATION
By utilizing open-source legal documents, normalized legal
knowledge, and automated document assembly technology, LTICs
transform some standardized transactional legal services into
commoditized transactional legal products.
A. OPEN-SOURCING FOR COLLABORATION AND NORMALIZED
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
The term "open-source" describes a method of software
development that harnesses the power of a distributed peer review,
transparency of process, and far greater freedom to use.67 Borrowing
the term from its roots in software development, legal open-sourcing
is the sustained mass online collaboration in the legal field. 68 Like
software, the promise of legal open-sourcing is "better quality, higher
reliability, more flexibility, lower cost, and an end to predatory
vendor lock-in."
69
There are also many social benefits to sharing resources through
online collaboration.70 Shared resources have been shown to increase
good faith and fair dealing in transactions.71 The growth of
collaborative platforms between lawyers that are not connected by a
firm, professional association, or otherwise, suggests a step towards
developing a better quality, lower cost resource, while also having the
added benefit of increasing professionalism and congeniality between
66. See, e.g. The LawGives Startup Pack-age, LAwGIvEs, https://lawgives.com/pages/start
up-package (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
67. About, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/about (last visited Apr. 8,
2014).
68. SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 44.
69. About, supra note 67.
70. BRET M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 77 (2012).
71. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator. Lawrers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valle, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 680 (1996)
(citing Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminarr Studv, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 59, 62 (1963)).
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lawyers.
One example of a lawyer collaboration platform is Legal
OnRamp.' Legal OnRamp allows lawyers to "stop re-inventing the
wheel" and share their expertise through access to thousands of
questions and answers provided on the website each day.73 The
website has the features of a social networking website that includes
messaging, blogs, databases, and open forums for discussion and
document sharing.74 In order to participate on Legal OnRamp,
members must be lawyers or third party legal service providers.75
Membership is by invitation only.76 Legal OnRamp's membership
base is primarily in-house corporate counsel.77 Another lawyer
collaboration platform is Docracy. It hopes to be the go-to for lawyers
wanting to share contracting ideas and to collaborate on editing
contracts. 78
But the underlying theme motivating sites, like Legal OnRamp
and Docracy, is not new to the transactional lawyer's task of contract
drafting. Among lawyers, there is a tradition of sharing contracting
knowledge within a firm, with their clients, with other transaction
professionals (like investment banks), and within professional or
trade associations.79 Over time, this sharing of knowledge through
private contracting negotiations creates generally accepted standards
within distinct legal communities80 This note calls these large bodies
of developed norms in contract language- facilitated by decades of
72. LEGAL ONRAMP, http://legalonramp.com/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). Another lawyer
collaboration platform is Casetext. Casetext is a free legal research platform that annotates
judicial opinions and statutes with freely provided analyses by prominent law professors and
attorneys to give the user unique insight. CASETEXT, https://casetext.com/ (last visited Mar. 17,
2014).
73. OnRamp collaboration services, LEGAL ONRAMP, http://legalonramp.com/index.php/
OnRamp-collaboration-services.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).




78. DOCRACY, https://www.docracy.com/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). It is unclear whether
Docracy remains an active collaboration environment as their blog has not been updated since
June 7, 2013. The Docrac Blog, DOCRACY, http://blog.docracy.com/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2014).
79. George Triantis, Improving Contract 2ualiti: Mloduarit. Technolog.k and Innovation




lawyer creation, collaboration and adoption -normalized legal
knowledge ("NLK"). With legal open-sourcing, the velocity at which
normalized legal knowledge would be created arguably accelerates, as
does the velocity (and thus volume) of code in the world of open
source software.
Since lawyers typically reuse contract language from previous
agreements and have little hope to copyright innovative language
they develop, they are not incentivized to innovate on these terms.81
The opportunity for cost-cutting incentivizes lawyers to standardize
agreements.F By decreasing the amount of time spent on drafting of
terms, lawyers can conclude transactions faster.' Like many contract-
based transactions, the venture financing process is largely
standardized through the open-sourcing of funding documents and
the generation of NLK attendant to the purpose and functionality of
each document and its generally accepted term language.
8 4
Standardizing increases the efficiency of these common business
transactions, which in turn arguably increases access to capital in the
relevant economy.
The collaborative open-source culture surrounding contract NLK
produces standardization that reduces costs and yields learning and
network benefits.85 However, NLK in contracting is a double-edged
sword. Standardization tends to chill innovation. 6 Novel contract
81. Triantis, supra note 79, at 186.
82. Id. at 188-89.
83. Id.
84. Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawrers, and Legal Practices in Silicon Vallei: A
Preliminari Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 563-64 (1989). Behind most of these form documents is a
noteworthy firm, who is building essential reputational capital with prospective clients. Cooley
provided the funding forms on TechStars. Fenwick & West provided the funding forms on
Series Seed. Wilson Sonsini provided the funding forms on Y-Combinator. Gunderson Dettmer
provided form contracts on Docracy. See, e.g., Open Sourced Model Seed Financinzg
Documents, TECHSTARS, http://www.techstars.com/docs/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); Series Seed
Financing Documents, SERIES SEED, http://www.seriesseed.com/posts/documents.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2014); Financing Documents, Y-COMB1NATOR, https://www.ycombinator.com/
documents/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2014); Gunderson Dettmer's LLP's Documents, DOCRACY,
https://www.docracy.com/doc/showalluserdocs?page-I&userld-80 (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
85. In economics and business, a network effect is the effect that one user of goods or
services has on the value of that product to other people. When present, the value of the
product or services is dependent on the number of others using it. Network Effect,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/network-effect.asp (last visited Oct. 25,
2014).
86. Triantis, supra note 79, at 194.
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terms are likely to face resistance from counterparties who potentially
bear the risk of unpredictable judicial interpretations or adverse
market reaction to the new terms.Y
However, despite the chilling effects of standardization, contract
innovation may still occur. As it has with software development,
open-source collaboration has the potential to improve contract
quality over time. There is a plausible down-market drift over time,
as professional services become standard products." For law, lawyers
at law firms create innovative provisions that eventually drift down-
market to be integrated into transactional legal products. 90 As the
innovation and tailored contract design procedures become simple
enough or as LTIC software becomes sophisticated enough, those
provisions will eventually be made available to the Long Tail. 91
B. DOCUMENT AUTOMATION: FROM STANDARDIZATION TO
COMMODITIZATION
Combining the large body of open-source collaboration and
contract NLK, LTICs develop software that automates the contract
drafting process by assembling the document for the user.92
Automation is possible because contracts are capable of being
modularized, meaning portions can be drafted, edited, read and re-
edited without necessarily requiring amendment or referencing to
other parts of the contract. 93 By exploiting the modularity of contract
terms, code can be written that allows for a user to add, adjust, swap,
and remove modules (i.e., whole contract provisions) based on the
user's responses to a series of questions about the transaction being
drafted. 94 Essentially, the technology enables a person to program
87. Triantis, supra note 79, at 194..
88. Id. at 203.
89. Id. at 200-01.
90. Id.
91. It is worth acknowledging that contract innovation for the Long Tail will not look like
existing examples of recent contract innovation, like the poison pill, that aligns with
sophisticated legal consumer interests (i.e., creating a defense for corporate boards against
takeovers). Innovation appropriate for the Long Tail would primarily seek to protect the
unsophisticated legal consumers' interests.
92. Id. at 189.
93. Id. at 191.
94. Triantis, supra note 79, at 191.
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contract language depending upon various sets of answers gathered
through interactive questionnaires with context-specific guidance that
change as users respond to them.95 LTICs effectively remove the
bottleneck of a lawyer's time spent during client intake, questioning
and analyzing the client's issues prior to the application of contract
NLK in drafting the contract. Instead of a lawyer, software (i.e.,
legally-informed, encoded expert systems) automates lawyer decision
making for the consumer's issue through coding via interactive
decision trees coded into software that purports to replicate a
lawyer's analysis of that issue.
Popular documents for automation are highly standardized
contractual agreements like wills, trusts, NDAs, articles of
incorporation, and employment agreements. Notable companies in
this space are RocketLawyer and LegalZoom, which both offer free
contract templates to draft and sign online.9 6 RocketLawyer has free
and fixed-fee document creation online.97 Similarly, LegalZoom has a
similar model for base fees for common services, e.g., LLC formation
for ninety-nine dollars plus the state filing fee.98 Cooley LLP's Cooley
GO suite of document generators utilizes Business Integrity's
ContractExpress software to draft all documents associated with
incorporation of the business entity, terms of use, privacy policy,
NDA, and various employment agreements for free. 99
Shake is a mobile phone application ("app") that allows the user
to "create, sign and send legally binding agreements in seconds" for
free.100 Shake claims to be the "Square for contracts."1 1 Square is an
95. Marc Lauritsen, Libert. Justice, and Legal Automata, 88 CHI. KENT L. REV. 945, 947
(2013).
96. LegalDocuments & Le galForms, ROCKETLAWYER, http://www.rocketlawyer.com/
legal-documents-forms.rl (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); DOCRACY, http://www.docracy.com/ (last
visited Mar. 9, 2014).
97. Plans andPricing, ROCKETLAWYER, http://www.rocketlawyer.com/plans-pricing.rl (last
visited Jan. 17, 2014).
98. LEGALZOOM, supra note 72.
99. Index of Cooley GO Document Generators, COOLEY LLP, http://www.cooleygo.com!
documents/ index-document-generators (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
100. SHAKE, http://www.shakelaw.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). RocketLawyer also has a
mobile app that allows the user to create an NDA. However, RocketLawyer's app functions
more as a client portal than a streamlined automated document assembly like Shake's app,
which has no such login gating function. See RocketLawyer app for iOS, available through the
Apple App Store.
101. Shake, ANGELLIST, http://angel.co/shake-I (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
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app that lowered the barrier to entry for small businesses to process
credit card payments by creating a mobile point of sale platform,
allowing their clients to avoid the steep overhead of an expensive
point of sale machine (both cash register and credit card reader). "
Square's clients receive the iconic square credit card readers for free,
then download the free app to their mobile devices, and can begin
accepting credit card payments immediately. 10 3 Similarly, Shake seeks
to lower the barrier to entry for individuals and small businesses to
draft simple contracts, like NDAs and freelance employment
agreements, via its mobile app.
10 4
Shake allows users to create plain English legal documents that
are signed digitally on the user's mobile device with the expectation
that the contract is both legally binding in court and sufficiently
detailed to resolve uncertainties about the agreement in the future
(thereby avoiding court). This model may prove useful for two
unsophisticated parties seeking to enter into an agreement more
formal than an oral agreement. Shake fits within the Long Tail by
allowing consumers to form a simple, legally-binding agreement that
is: (1) free, unlike the paid model of LegalZoom, and (2) formatted
for mobile, unlike Docracy's free web-based contracts. However,
while Square has charged a small transaction fee, it is unclear if Shake
plans to monetize its business model.05
In his Wall Street Journal critique of Harper's book, The Lawyer
Bubble, Richard Epstein writes, "The most significant recent
dislocation in the practice of law ... is at the consumer end of the
market: the rise of low-cost online law firms like LegalZoom and
RocketLawyer that aid clients in drafting standard partnerships, wills,
leases and the like."',0 6 But Shake's FAQ makes clear that it seeks to
help those with simple, low-stakes transactions." Shake is targeting
people who would not likely seek legal counsel otherwise. It is finally
addressing the Long Tail, which Shake's founder calls "TinyLaw."' 08
102. SQUARE, http://squareup.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
103. Id.
104. Shake app for iOS, available through the Apple App Store.
105. SellAn Hhere, SQUARE, http://squareup.com/sell-anywhere (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
106. Richard Epstein, The Rule of La wlers, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2013, at A13.
107. FAQ, SHAKE, http://www.shakelaw.com/faqs/#2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
108. Abe Geiger, Ii7at is TiniLa iv:, SHAKE (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.shakelaw.com/tiny
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With four million dollars raised so far, 0 9 Shake's legal product
capitalizes on key post-recession consumer values: (1) addressing the
consumer's willingness to try new brands by increasing accessibility
through offering the application on mobile, (2) simplification through
"plain English" and offering six different form contracts from which
the user may choose (including a "Create Your Own" option with
almost infinite possibilities), and (3) the desire to economize by
offering the app and contract creation service for free.
Shake has built automation on top of a simplified offering of
standardized documents and their associated NLK to create a
completely free alternative that aligns with the needs of consumers
purchasing products in the Long Tail. The current types of contracts
offered are: "Freelance/Hire" (freelancing or work for hire
agreements), "Keep Confidential" (NDA), "Buy/Sell" (a sales
receipt, not intended for auto or motorcycle sales), "Rent/Lend" (no
real-estate property only), "Loan Money" (lending or borrowing),
"Create Your Own" (letting the user write out the agreement after
putting in party names).
In the pro bono space, LTICs like LawHelp Interactive use
automated document assembly software to fill out and submit court
filings such as child custody, dissolution of marriage, or a protective
order. 110 LawHelp is trying to connect users to legal documents for
free after the user answers a series of questions on his legal issue."'
The software is available online and can be accessed through any web
browser by the consumer himself or by legal aid organizations, courts,
and clerk's offices, who walk the client through the series of interview
questions to help the consumer complete the form." 2 Like automatic
contract drafting programs, the LawHelp software relies on its
law/#more-823.
109. Brouwse Startups, ANGELLIST, http://angel.co/companies?markets[] -Legal (last visited
Mar. 7,2014).
110. Find Forms, LAWHELP.ORG, http://www.lawhelp.org/findforms (last visited Mar. 14,
2014); FAOS, A2J AUTHOR COMMUNITY, http://www.a2jauthor.org/drupal/?q-node/123 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2014).
111. FindForms, supra note 110.
112. See, e.g. Protective Order Kit for Texas, LAwHELP INTERACTIVE, http://lawhelpinter
active.org/login form?template-id-template.2010-10-12.0355896585 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014);
see FAOS, A2J AUTHOR COMMUNITY, http://www.a2jauthor.org/drupal/ ?q-node/123 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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understanding of NLK to develop the interview questions to help the
consumer fill out necessary legal forms for standard court
proceedings like filing a protective order or dissolution of marriage.
Automated document assembly for legal aid organizations provides a
much needed increase in efficiency that may translate into increased
access to justice.
IV. CREATING NEW LEGAL DEMAND:
PROTECTING OR HARMING CONSUMERS'?
Entering into a formal contractual agreement without consulting
a lawyer is common in some transactions like purchasing a home or
signing a lease agreement for an apartment. Undoubtedly, a lawyer's
review of any of these contracts would be ideal if money was no
object and time was irrelevant. Thus, a natural outcome out of the
post-recession consumer's need for lower pricing and expeditious
processing is creating a means for simple, consumer legal transactions
to proceed effectively without the personalized counseling of a
lawyer. While the existing legal guidance technology used by LTICs
still pales in comparison to an adept lawyer's advice, an LTIC is
arguably superior to the alternative-a lay consumer trying to draft a
contract out of whole cloth. LTIC quality should continue to increase
through open-sourcing and online collaboration within professional
and user communities.
Mobile contracting apps like Shake take this freedom to contract
a step further by allowing legal consumers to formalize any number of
common agreements without the assistance of a lawyer.
Hypothetically, contract creation can occur on-the-fly. Moreover,
with the user-friendly design of an app like Shake, consumers are
encouraged to use the app to formalize agreements that were once
never put into writing. By encouraging consumers to formalize
previously informal agreements, LTICs create demand for automated
contract assembly, a transactional legal product.
Economic theory supports that technical progress creates
demand, thereby inducing capital accumulation, and ultimately
sustains economic growth.11 3 LTICs are generating the technological
113. Aoki & Yoshikawa, supra note 16.
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innovation and development that is creating demand in the legal
marketplace.
Recalling Henderson's chart of the current legal ecosystem, the
Long Tail can be visualized as existing on a plane measuring
complexity and cost of the legal deliverable along the y-axis and the
measure of replicability of that legal deliverable along the x-axis
(ranging from bespoke to standardized to commoditized, adopting
Susskind's legal work continuum) (See Figure 3). Various legal
services and products, ranging from high to low cost and complexity
and low to high replicability are depicted along a power law curve
plotted in this graph. LTICs' creation of demand for legal products
exists in the Long Tail within the narrowing, right hand side of the
power law curve. LTICs are among the low cost providers that
Henderson identifies in his chart.
114
It is understandable that the hypothesis that some LTICs are
actually creating more legal demand immediately calls the question,
as it should, whether this type of demand creation is a good thing for
society. While demand creation may signal a market opportunity for
entrepreneurs to develop contract drafting apps and litigators to bring
more enforcement actions in the courts, how are consumers
potentially benefitting or being harmed by embracing this new
method to formalize their business agreements'?
The idea of companies creating demand for formalizing legal
contracts to transact business without the assistance of a lawyer
necessarily brings to the foreground the heated debate over the
quality of automated contracts. This is partially due to the
information asymmetry in the lawyer-client relationship that creates a
"lemons problem.""' A lemons problem, as economist George
Akerlof popularized in his 1970 paper, is created through the
information asymmetry occurring when the seller knows more about
a product than the buyer. 6 The classic example Akerlof uses is a
used car sale. 7 The buyer of a used car does not know beforehand
which cars are of good or bad quality, so the buyer's best guess for a
114. Henderson, supra note 43.
115. Lemons Problem, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/lemons-
problem.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
116. Id.
117. Lemons Problem, supra note 115.
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given car is that of average quality.118 Ultimately, the bad drives out
the good from the market because buyers are only willing to pay for
an average quality used car and sellers of good used cars will be
unable to get a high enough price to make it worthwhile.19
Consequently, markets may falter or fail to exist altogether where
quality uncertainty is coupled with asymmetric information.' The
exception is a market that on the whole has reasonable guarantees of
quality and certainty where there will always be a distinct advantage
for some vendors to offer low-quality goods to the less-informed
segment. 12
Thus, LTICs providing low-quality legal products to the lay legal
consumer may succeed in a market with quality uncertainty and
asymmetric information. However, if even a low-quality contract can
encourage parties to act according to the perceived duties of the
contract by crystallizing and memorializing their intentions
effectively, then LTICs still provide value by protecting, to some less
formal degree, a party's interest in future disputes.
If we assume de minimis concern over contract quality in this
respect, then the bottleneck of information asymmetry in the lawyer-
client relationship concerning contract drafting is alleviated
proportionately. This should spur the creation of a more efficient
consumer marketplace by formalizing these previously informal
agreements and expanding the legal marketplace to reach a high
percentage of niche consumers. This potential for expansion of the
legal marketplace presents an enormous business opportunity for
LTICs.
However, LTICs like Shake may not, in fact, create new demand.
Some of Shake's users were already creating their own legal




121. Id. However, the market for legal contracts may be an exception to the lemon problem
because consumers are guaranteed protection from the detrimental consequences of poorly
drafted contracts under multiple bodies of common law (agency, tort and contract), as well as
ethics laws (e.g.,the unauthorized practice of law). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5
(2013). Also, common law (agency, tort, contract law) provides a degree of consumer protection
against poorly drafted contracts.
122. See, e.g. Aeet Shake User Travis K Alendoza, SHAKE (Apr. 11, 2014),
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would cut and paste their own contracts from online legal
resources.123 Shake increases their users' productivity as small
businesses by eliminating time they used to spend on creating their
own ad hoc contracts for business dealings. Regardless, Shake does
capture users -individual consumers, and not just small businesses-
who would never have bothered creating their own ad hoc contracts.
But, is it a social good that these unsophisticated legal consumers,
who previously never engaged in the legal marketplace, are now
easily making (and want to make) formal contracts for their everyday
transactions'?
A. Is MORE CONTRACTING NECESSARILY GOOD FOR CONSUMERS'?
Optimizing the value of a particular contract for a particular
client is the objective of a legal contract document. 124 Contractual
relationships often succeed without the threat of legal enforcement
because parties are already implicitly motivated to maintain the
relationship for repeat dealing or reputation preservation. 2' Thus,
"the value of a contract stems largely from the incremental incentive
effect of legal enforcement, net of the expected cost of dispute
resolution and enforcement. 1 26 Because a contract memorializes and
communicates terms and expectations more clearly than when parties
merely orally agree to terms, a formal written contract is more
valuable than no contract because it reduces expected costs of dispute
resolution. 27
Long Tail consumers feel empowered by this new freedom to
create formal contracts, which releases them from the historic anxiety
produced by the uncertainty in creating and enforcing informal
business agreements, much less having no agreement.' 8 Thus, beyond
http://www.shakelaw.com/meet-shake-user-travis-k-mendoza/#more-1236.
123. Mfeet Shake User Travis K Mendoza, supra note 122.




128. See, e.g., Mfeet Shake User Chiistine Amorose, SHAKE (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.shake
law.com/meet-shake-user-christine-amorose/#more-1096 (Christine, a freelance writer, says
Shake lets her focus on what she's good at, being a writer, not a legal agreement negotiator and
drafter); "Sweet" Wais For Your Business to Use Shake, SHAKE (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.
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the contract produced, consumers gain a psychological benefit from
formalizing their agreements. For example, Shake believes its users
achieve "peace of mind" and elimination of anxiety through using
Shake's automated contracts. 1' 9
Furthering the consumer's peace of mind, contracts drafted
through automated document assembly can eliminate an obvious
source of misinterpretation: differing languages spoken by the
contracting parties. For example, Peppercorn is an Italian-based
LTIC specializing in automated contract drafting in multiple
languages that purport to be binding in all of the EU.130 Even if the
contract is not perfect, a contract is still valuable because of the actual
process of drafting the contract's key terms that require each party to
clarify its expectations prior to entering into a formal agreement. 31
B. CONTRACT QUALITY ISSUES
While today's post-recession consumers want the anxiety-
allaying aspect of formal contracting, they are too cost conscious to
focus on speculative variance in contract quality.1 3 -2 Long Tail
consumers, and the potential lawyers who would represent them, are
typically unable to determine the degree of quality that is needed for
a given legal transaction. Law firms and clients have not developed
universally agreed upon metrics "to calculate the incremental value of
the premium contract and therefore, cannot reasonably assess
whether the clients are getting their money's worth."
1 33
Since nearly all consumers in the Long Tail are likewise unable
to assess any such incremental value in "quality," they cannot
determine whether or not a lawyer's assistance would be cost-
shakelaw.com/sweet-w ays-small-business-use-shake/#more-967.
129. "Sweet" Wtais For Your Business to Use Shake, supra note 128.
130. PEPPERCORN, http://www.peppercorn.it/en (last visited Apr. 9, 2014). Peppercorn,
ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/peppercorn-I (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
131. LTICs might wish to consider giving parties the options to capture and archive some or
all interim version of their documents, which could serve as interpretive guides for subsequent
dispute resolution. E-mail from David W. Johnson, Lecturer-in-Law, Stanford Law School, to
author (Sept. 24, 2014, 09:06 PDT) (on file with author).
132. Triantis, supra note 79, at 180.
133. Id. (emphasis added). This is, perhaps, because it is almost impossible for lawyers or
their clients to measure said incremental value.
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effective. Consequently, these consumers default away from having a
lawyer draft the legal document. This reflects a common pitfall caused
by the information asymmetry between lawyers and clients.134
Consumer rationalization of quality is made even easier because of
the lack of consensus over what is a high quality contract versus a low
quality contract even among lawyers and their sophisticated clients.
However, LTICs may change how some lawyers define the
quality of legal work to prove their value to consumers.13' The old
way of defining value was through the price of billable hours, the
firm's brand reputation, size, and value of deals, and the size and
monetary value of court judgments. But correlation is not necessarily
causation, and these relationships are nearly impossible to measure,
and thus prove.1 36 Corporate clients' incomplete toolkit for
maximizing overall value of their legal services comprises:
"managing" cost, measuring and benchmarking to identify outside
counsel's value, streamlining process, locating and improving other
efficiencies, and finding better ways to structure fee arrangements
and budgeting.1 37 The new ways of evaluating a firm's overall value
used by sophisticated corporate clients will continue to help define
quality for less sophisticated legal consumers, namely the Long Tail
legal consumer. With the potential to vastly increase data analysis and
transparency, LTICs signal a movement away from the old value
system towards ones of accessibility, ease-of-use, efficiency and
overall value-add to a wider variety of potential clients.
Foregoing legal counsel can be extremely problematic because
damage from defective or incomplete legal efficacy is far more likely
when no lawyer is involved.1 38 In estate planning, the growing
popularity of automated document assembly engenders common
errors and lost opportunities to many unwitting Long Tail
134. Ribstein, supra note 31, at 753.
135. Stanford Law School, Future Law 2013 Legal Disruption: IRb Now?: bhY Here:'
that's Next:. YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-GjI6iKiGlfc&
list-PL48E61CI21CADOEIB&index-3.
136. Triantis, supra note 79, at 180.
137. David Parnell, Dr. Silvia Hodges Silverstein, On the Evolution of Legal Consumers,
FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidparnell/2014/09/08/dr-silvia-
hodges-silverstein-on-the-evolution-of-legal-consumers/.
138. Lauritsen, supra note 95, at 953.
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consumers. 139 As Tim Hwang, a fellow at the Stanford Center for
Legal Informatics, acknowledges, "even if not actively malicious, the
proliferations of negligently designed systems might harm the
public., 140 Therefore, "policy arguments in favor of disallowing
automated legal assistance systems generally involve protection of the
public and protection of the legal profession. 1 4 For automated
contract drafting, the contract created through an app does, on its
face, seem superior to the user's prior contract drafting methods of
cobbling together readily available form agreements found on the
internet. 1 42 However, a superior system would be generating an
application programming interface ("API"), which is a set of
structured rules for third-party applications to access and make
requests to a service, that would allow the state judiciary to track
companies and lawyers offering automated legal services. 43 As
Hwang, explains the legal API would be "open," permitting third-
parties or lawyers to provide preapproved whitelist "automated legal
services to the public so long as the total number of transactions
processed stayed within certain preset rate limits.,
144
In the absence of an open API system for LTICs, if the primary
purpose of the contract is to create the proper incentives for
upholding the expectations of the relationship, then the quality of the
contract may never be measured by its effectiveness via judicial
interpretation or coercive enforcement by the state.1 4 LTICs like
Shake may succeed in providing an easily digestible, plain English
exchange of promises that deliver only the optics of a legally binding
agreement. Still, by formalizing these simple exchanges of promises,
servicing the Long Tail consumers' simple contract drafting needs
139. Wendy S. Goffe & Rochelle L. Haller, From Zoom to Doom:? Risks of Do-It-Yourself
Estate Planning, 38 EST. PLAN. 27, 28 (2011), avaialable at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id -1824425.
140. Hwang, supra note 12, at 9. People, CODEX: THE STANFORD CENTER FOR LEGAL
INFORMATICS, http://www.stanford.edu/group/codex/cgi-bin/codex/people/ (last visited Sept. 25,
2014).
141. Lauritsen, supra note 95, at 953.
142. There are other large bodies of common law protecting- e.g., agency, tort,
employment-that may provide a default protecting Shake contracts. "Sweet" Wais For Your
Business to Use Shake, supra note 128.
143. Hwang, supra note 12, at 20-22.
144. Id. at 22.
145. Triantis, supra note 79, at 183.
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may ultimately help temporarily reduce some strain on the
overburdened civil court systems, by keeping some legal disputes over
oral contracts out of courts, regardless of whether or not the LTIC-
generated contract is enforceable for the disputed purpose. However,
this remains only a possible (and yet unproven) temporary benefit
that LTICs provide. LTICs must continue to increase contract quality
and accuracy for Long Tail consumers to ensure compliance with the
ABA's policies of protecting the public that underlie the purpose of
legal licensing.146
C. THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
While beyond the scope of this note, it must be noted that legal
ethics doctrine, animated by interests in protecting the public against
legal services provided by unqualified actors and preserving integrity
in the legal profession, constrain LTICs significantly.147 The
unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") is implicated in the core
business model of all automated document assembly services that
incorporate NLK and essentially mimic a lawyer's interpretation and
decision-making. 148 The California State Bar Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibit a member lawyer from aiding any person or entity
in the unauthorized practice of law and from practicing in a
jurisdiction in which they are not qualified (i.e., not a member of that
state's Bar). 149 Each state's bar has its own rule barring UPL. In many
states, UPL is a crime. 's
This universal rule is why all LTICs have robust disclaimers on
their websites notifying their customers that they are not law firms,
are not providing legal advice, and are not creating attorney-client
relationships that are protected by privilege or attorney work product
doctrine. s Ultimately, the enforcement entities (courts and state bar
146. Hwang, supra note 12, at 24.
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt 2 (2013). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT PREAMBLE (2013). For a comprehensive survey of legal precedent regarding the
unauthorized practice of law and early LTICs, see Hwang, supra note 12, at 10-19.
148. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2013).
149. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1-300 (2014).
150. See, e.g. id.
151. See, e.g. Terms of Use, LAWGIVES, https://lawgives.com/terms of use (last visited Mar.
11, 2014); Terms of Service, SHAKE, http://www.shakelaw.com/terms/ (last visited Mar. 11,
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associations) hold the power to regulate LTICs. Since the incumbents
(lawyers) run the disciplinary and enforcement entities, it is unclear
what the fate of the LTIC will be with respect to UPL liability given
the potential incentives to eliminate these competing companies from
the legal marketplace.5 2
V. LTIC'S DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL AND THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR LAW FIRMS
While some critics go so far as to purport that the "Big Law" firm
model is dying, at this stage, LTIC is simply not replacing bespoke
legal services.1 3 Even though venture capitalists see enough to
support investing in LTICs, these companies represent only a small
(but growing) portion of the revenue in the total legal marketplace.5 4
AngelList, a platform for startups, lists about six hundred legal
startups as of September 2014, up from 450 legal startups in April
2014.155 Far fewer, like the legal research platforms and online dispute
resolution services, would qualify as LTICs. Regardless, LTICs are
expanding the legal ecosystem by broadening what it means to be a
profitable, growing legal business in today's legal economy.
Additionally, academics and legal commentators acknowledge
that the legal profession is ripe for disruption.15 6 According to
2014); Terms and Conditions, LAWPAL, http://lawpal.com/legal/terms! (last visited Mar. 11,
2014). The extensive use of these disclosures likely stems from the Texas rule that ensures a
product will not be deemed UPL if the product contains a statement that it is not a substitute for
the advice of an attorney. TEX. GOVT CODE § 81.101(c) (2007). Hwang analyzes the problems
with this UPL framework "based on notice and disclaimer." Hwang, supra note 12, at 17.
152. However, the California Supreme Court held in Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic Inc.
that "legal aid societies serve an important public interest" and was not in violation of
California's UPL regulations. Frye v. Tenderloin Hous. Clinic, Inc., 129 P.3d 408, 417 (Cal.
2006).
153. Noam Scheiber, Yes, Big Law Reall is Du n , THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114065/death-big-law-firms-cant-be-ignored. FAQ, SHAKE,
http://www.shakelaw.com/faqs/#2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
154. Rachel Zahorsky, Rh1 Silicon Vallei 's Biggest Investors are Betting on Alternative
Legal Companies, ABA J., http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/silicon-valleys-biggest
_investors are betting-on-alternative legal-cos/ (last updated Sept. 25, 2013).
155. LegalStartups, ANGELLIST, https://angel.co/legal (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
156. See -enerallr HLS PLP, Disruptive Innovation Conference - The Effects on Clients.




Harvard Business School professor Clayton Christensen, disruptive
innovation transforms a historically expensive and complicated
product (accessible to few) into a more affordable and simplified
product (accessible to many).5 7 Traditional legal products and
services are ripe for this type of disruption because of a paradoxical
problem in the legal profession: there are too many lawyers and there
are too few lawyers.158
While the future of law may ultimately be transformed by truly
disruptive technologies, many legal technology companies, in their
current iterations, are not "disruptive" to the legal services industry
as Christensen defines the term. 59 Disruptive technologies are
innovations that virtually fracture an existing market and value
network by bringing to market a very different value proposition than
was previously available.1 60 There are few legal technology companies
that bring a truly different value proposition to the market because
many of these companies simply unbundle traditional legal services
from other legal work that does not require a lawyer, allowing non-
lawyers to produce legal deliverables for consumers. In short, all the
hype aside, most LTICs are using technology to lower prices; ceteris
paribas, the increased access for consumers and the creation of new
demand, emanates from the lower price point.
An additional doctrinal constraint on innovation in the American
legal profession is the strict rule prohibiting (1) nonlawyer ownership
of any company deemed to be delivering legal services, and (2) the
sharing of revenue derived from a lawyer's work with any
nonlawyer.1 6' The United Kingdom liberalized its legal profession
with the passage of the Legal Services Act 2007 ("LSA") to eliminate
these prohibitions in the U.K.' 6' The LSA allows for ownership and
157. Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Innovation, CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN,
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2014); HLS PLP,
Disruptive Innovation Conference - The Nature of Disruptive Innovation in Professional
Services, YouTUBE (Mar. 6,2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-RBtAMcrbFXg.
158. HLS PLP, supra note 156.
159. Jordan Furlong, What disruption realli means, LAw21 (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.
law21.ca 2013/04/w-hat-disruption-really-means/.
160. CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA xviii (2011).
161. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013).
162. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (U.K.).
Winter 2015
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
profit sharing of legal services businesses with nonlawyer owners. 163
Measuring the outcomes of legislation like the LSA is difficult
because of a lack of unified quality measurements and concrete
data. 164 Despite this reality, in 2012, the Legal Services Board
("LSB"), the governing body in charge of executing the LSA,
published a Final Baseline Report on the impact of the LSA and its
objectives.1 6 Due to the constraints, the report deemed many of the
legislative outcomes inconclusive, while noting a few of the desired
changes in consumer confidence and public perception remain
unchanged in a four-year period following the passage of the LSA.
166
However, this study may not be indicative of the LSA's actual success
because "most of the new legislation [went] into effect in 2011 or
2012. 5167
Similar liberalization efforts arise regularly in the United States.
Most recently, one such effort was defeated by the American Bar
Association's Ethics Commission in 2013.168 Instead, American law
firms and lawyers continue, directly or indirectly, to capitalize on
limitations imposed on LTICs, like nonlawyer ownership and UPL
rules. Lawyers also have the opportunity to embrace their state's
possible adoption of revised Rule 1.2(c) under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and ABA guidance expanding a lawyer's ability
to engage in limited scope representation (i.e., unbundled services).169
Because of the ethics rules, common law, state and federal
statutes, civil and criminal law that are in place to protect consumers
from lawyer misbehavior, lawyers alone have the ability to form the
attorney-client relationship, withhold privileged material in court, and
provide legal advice.170 Law firms, ironically, are best positioned to
163. Id.
164. LEGAL SERVS. BD., MARKET IMPACTS OF THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT 2007-BASELINE
REPORT 17 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news -publications/
publications/pdf/20121(P3_evaluation baseline report final.pdf.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 19-20; E. Leigh Dance, The UK Legal Services Act: What Impacts Loom for
Global La w Firm Competition?, AM. BAR ASS'N LAW PRACTICE 34 at 35 (July-Aug 2008),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law-practice-home/law-practice
_archive/lpm-magazine-articles v34 is5 pg35.html.
168. ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 464 (2013).
169. HOLLENBAUGH, supra note 21.
170. See, e.., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2013).
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provide services in the Long Tail because they already have the legal
knowledge, both NLK and bespoke, necessary to begin an attorney-
client relationship seamlessly with consumers seeking Long Tail
products.171 By acknowledging the potential in providing legal work to
this new client base, and developing the innovative applications to
service them, law firms could alleviate, by expansion, the seemingly
intractable problem of otherwise increasing profitability, gaining and
holding clients, and growing their business.17 Put differently, growing
a legal business could mean modularizing and delivering existing
services, like contract drafting, specifically tailored for the needs of
the Long Tail and the post-recession consumer who is in need of
simple legal services that do not require a lawyer's judgment and
analysis beyond the generally accepted norms ("NLK"). Some law
firms are capitalizing on this opportunity by providing free automated
document assembly-for example, Cooley LLP's Cooley GO
Document Generators for incorporation of a business entity,
employment agreements, terms of service, privacy policy, etc. 173
Another example is Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati's Term Sheet
Generator that creates a venture financing term sheet based on a
consumer's responses to an online questionnaire. 17 4 It remains to be
seen if these firms will continue to develop automated document
assembly for transactional legal products for the Long Tail.
The last decade saw a rise of many "mega-institutions,"
companies of unprecedented size and scope that merged in order to
171. In business, White Space is more than uncharted territory or an underserved market, it
is the range of potential activities not defined or addressed by the company's current business
model. White Space is unlike adjacencies, products or services that fit well within the current
organization's business model and serve new customers or existing customers in fundamentally
different ways. White Space is the opportunities outside a company's core competency and
beyond its adjacencies that require a different business model to exploit it. When managing
innovation, White Space provides absolute freedom from the previous business formulae and
permission to do whatever it takes to keep growing. Mark Johnson, The White Space and
Business A-odel Innovation: FindiQg Brilliant Opportunities Outside Your Core, SEIZING THE
WHITE SPACE: BuIsNEss MODEL INNOVATION FOR GROWN AND REVIVVAL 5 (Harvard Bus.
Press 2010).
172. Law Firms in Transition: An Altman Wei Flash Survei, ALTMAN WELL (2013),
http://www.altmanweil.com/dir-docs/resource/2d831a80-8156-4947-9fOf-ld97eec632a5-
document.pdf.
173. Index of Cooley GO Document Generators, supra note 99.
174. WSGR Term Sheet Generator, WSGR, http://www.wsgr.comwsgr/display.aspx?
sectionname-practice/termsheet.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
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differentiate from their smaller competitors."' Other power law
distributions were also exacerbated. The Pareto Principle seems less
relevant today in describing wealth inequality, when the top 0.01
percent of the population outpaces wealth growth in the 99.99 percent
by a factor of four. 76 In law, there has been a rise of mega-firms,
which actually opens the door for an even larger Long Tail. 77 As Eric
Schmidt, Google's Executive Chairman, notes, "it's also hard to make
money if you don't have a [Long] Tail (to satisfy minority taste, which
improves the consumer experience), but the revenues are
disproportionality in the Head." 78
Firms will no doubt continue to focus their energy on the
substantial revenues in bespoke legal services (the head). The current
level of sophistication of LTICs means they cannot compete with law
firms' standardized legal work. Firms need not fear LTICs currently
because they do not need to service consumers wanting Long Tail
products to meet their financial objectives. Moreover, legal services
are not one-hundred percent commoditizable, which means there will
always be a need for bespoke legal services, the bread and butter of
law firms."79 There would appear to be a correlation between the
increased sophistication of an LTIC's ability to fine-tune for a
particular client's needs, and the increased threat to law firms'
monopoly on bespoke legal services. However, absent a significant
change in the law governing lawyers, the unauthorized practice of law
remains a formidable barrier to the full realization of sophistication of
non-lawyer automated document assembly software.' 80
It is axiomatic that diversifying revenue streams reduces
businesses risk. By focusing entirely on bespoke (or even
standardized) legal services, law firms ignore the opportunity to also
175. Chris Anderson, Does the Long Tail create bigger hits or smaller ones?, THE LONG
TAIL: CHRIS ANDERSON'S BLOG (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.longtail.com/the-long-tail/
2008/1 /does-the-long-t.html.
176. Derek Thompson, How You, Ale andEverrone Got the Top ] Percent All Wirong, THE
ATLANTIC ONLINE (Mar. 30, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2014/03/how-you-me-and-everyone-got-the-top-l-percent-all-wrong/359862/.
177. Anderson, supra note 175.
178. Id.
179. SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 24.
180. See Innovating ifithin the Professional Alonopoly." The Law of Unauthorized Practice
Aeets The Technolok Boom, STANFORD LAW NCH. (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.law. stanford.
edu/ event/2014/04/17/innovating-within-the-professional-monopoly-the-law-of-unauthorized.
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diversify by providing commoditized legal products. Law firms not
spending some degree of resources on the development of
commoditized transactional legal products in the Long Tail are
ignoring a significant opportunity to diversify their consumer base,
thereby losing ground to those firms that do so.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1. Bill Henderson's Chart on The Legal Whiteboard 181
In this chart, LTICs would occupy the space denoted as "Legal
Publishers."
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